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                                       “Immanence can be said to be the burning issue of all philosophy
                                                because it takes on all the dangers that philosophy must confront,
                                                all the condemnations, persecutions, and repudiations that it under-
                                                goes...It is not immediately clear why immanence is so dangerous, 
                                                but it is. It engulfs sages and gods”.  (Deleuze and Guattari: What is
                                                Philosophy? p. 45)

                                              “Whoever wants to understand, calculate, comprehend in a moment
                                                where with profoundly sustained emotion he ought to hold fast the
                                                unintelligible as sublime, may be called rational...he has annihilated
                                                and lost his instinct”. (Nietzsche: On the Advantage and Disadvantage
                                                of History for Life, p. 28).
  
 The claim I shall seek to justify here is that the radicalisation of Kant’s project of the critique of metaphysics can be said to culminate in the fusion of two, traditionally opposed, terms - immanence and sublimity. I shall begin by attempting to identify and clarify the main features of the immanent sublime before proceeding to outline its role in the texts of a number of thinkers. The recent attention paid to Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime’ will establish the broad framework of my discussion.    
                                                          I
 The formulation of a positive conception of immanence is both made possible and necessitated by the demise in credibility of that to which it was traditionally negatively opposed and referred, namely, the transcendent. This critique of the transcendent generates a deconstructive and transvaluative momentum in relation to the metaphysical immanent/transcendent opposition, in which the sublime is aligned with the transcendent. This critical process surpasses the merely negative task of exposing the ‘dialectical illusions’ of metaphysics and the ‘translation’ of the transcendent into immanent terms and undertakes the excavation of a ‘post-metaphysical’ terrain of immanence, a task from which texts and thinkers hitherto considered to be ‘metaphysical’ are not excluded. To assume that an insistence on the primacy of immanence is no more than a process of ‘relativisation’ which precludes the thematisation of such a ‘new’ transvalued ‘ground’ is to fail to execute a ‘total critique’ of metaphysics and to continue to resist immanence by reductively appropriating it to that which it makes possible. To insist on the primacy of relation is not, necessarily, to espouse ‘relativism’. The most obvious instance of this ‘partial critique’ is the substitution of a theocentric with a merely anthropological perspective. Such a premature cessation of critique unjustifiably grants ‘metaphysics’ a monopoly over a themes such as the sublime and refuses to complete the task of deanthropo-morphisation necessary to the affirmation of immanence refuses, that is, to bring these critical insights fully to bear on subjectivity and the ‘human’ itself.     
 The main features of a transvalued notion of immanence can be outlined briefly. Of central significance is the ‘ontological’ primacy of producibility, creativity, ‘synthesis’ etc., which are not referred to an allegedly pre-given self-presence beyond or outside the field of immanence. To affirm immanence is to displace notions of intentional design, self-determination, consciousness etc., and to insist on the primacy of a fully positive auto-poietic process of self-differentiation. All thinkers of immanence, even those whose vocabulary suggests otherwise, accord ‘becoming’ a primacy over ‘being’. They thereby displace the notions of ‘origin’ and telos and affirm the priority of becoming as an intrinsically reciprocal process more fundamental than that which becomes.
 Ontologically immanence is undoubtedly more ‘monistic’ than ‘dualistic’ in orientation, although caution is required in the use of such terms insofar as to thematise immanence is to eschew completely the metaphysics of substance and subject. Deleuze and Guattari, for instance, refer in this regard to a ‘plural monism’ [cf. TP pp. 20, 253-56, 265-72]. It is also, on as much ‘genealogical’ as ontological grounds, the case that a thought of immanence gravitates more to a ‘materialist’ than ‘idealist’ perspective, even though the majority of  materialisms, both philosophical and scientific, have been and remain saturated with metaphysical and idealist anthropomorphic categories and values and thereby resisted immanence. Materialism is, therefore, a necessary rather than sufficient condition for the radical thematisation of immanence. 
 Although inherently ‘monistic’ immanentism does not entail reductivism a charge which, from an immanentist perspective, is far more applicable to dualist ontologies so far as these are predicated on the drive to institute and defend a realm of pure interiority and self-presence from inherently disseminative forces. Immanent critique is not, therefore, ‘eliminative’. It merely contests the idealist interpretation of phenomena undeniably unique to, for instance, human culture and the metaphysical value and assumptions concerning the potency and limits of matter that underpin any ‘irreducibility thesis’ concerning attributes which, arguably, ‘privilege’ human beings over other animals (e.g. logos, reason, asceticism, intentionality, ‘understanding of being’, etc.). Immanence knows only differences in degree and complexity within a shared, unified field rather than distinctions in kind and essence. 
 Many immanentists therefore develop elaborate ‘dualisms’ of principle and differ-entiate between dimensions whilst sustaining a unified ontological vision (e.g. ‘affirmation/denial of the will to live’, ‘Apollonian/Dionysian’, ‘reactive/active forces’, ‘eros/thanatos’, ‘ontological/ontic’, ‘continuity/discontinuity of being’,  ‘reterretorialisation/deterretorialisation’). Although often unapologetically hierarchised and prioritized immanentist thinkers endeavor in their thematisation of them, to complicate and undermine the appearance of dualism and fixed oppositionality (cf. TP pp. 20-2, 10, 227). An immanentist will seek to treat the contrasts of principle and dimension they propound in ‘economic’ or ‘pre-oppositional’ rather than oppositional terms and resist a ‘dialectical’ conception of their intense fusion in certain phenomena. The relation such thinkers establish between these hierarchised principals and dimensions of immanence can be described as one of ‘finite priority’ which overcome the ‘unconditioned’/‘conditioned’ opposition. The ontologically primary process is considered to radically immanent to its ‘effects’. Immanence does not dissolve the ‘transcendental’ but rather restores it to the ‘empirical’. Immanentists posit a two-way model of derivation instead of the metaphysical relation of uni-directional conditioning between a completely underived ground a totally derivative grounded.           
 In logical terms the rethinking of immanence concerns the displacement of negation by difference. Immanentists develop a radical logic of relation in which conjunction supplants ‘exclusive disjunction’ [cf. TP pp. 25, 98-100; AO pp. 110-12]. In this sense the field of immanence, although not yet determined by negation, is not an unmediated unity but is rather ‘always already’ irresolvably different from itself in itself, outside of and in excess of itself in itself without reference to ‘lack’ or ‘need’. Neither one nor many it is intrinsically multiple. Immanence is the not yet determined domain of difference that contains an intrinsic ‘self-organizing’ capacity that generates a ‘horizon’ that makes possible non-privatively incomplete ‘identities’ or fully positive ‘partial objects’ [cf. AO pp. 323-37]. The differential field of immanence does not eliminate identity but simulates it impersonally. 
 The issue of the evaluative dimensions of immanence has proved controversial. The affirmation of immanence undeniably undermines the traditional grounds and absolutes of ethical and political critique. Nonetheless, it does not, as some varieties of ‘post-modernism’ have assumed, render judgment impotent and ethical and political critique bereft of resources. On the contrary, a whole new ‘ground’ of critique emerges that deepens and radicalizes the diagnostic potency of ethical and political critique and generates new forms of resistance and strategy. Immanence entails an inextricable ‘complicity’ yet this does not preclude the emergence of ‘post-metaphysical’ criteria of evaluation, selection, qualitative differentiation and hierarchy. Many of the most celebrated immanentists (e.g. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bataille, Foucault, and Deleuze/Guattari) have unashamedly and polemically proposed, albeit in often very different guises, what Nietzsche termed ‘principles of a new evaluation’. The emphasis here is on notions such as ‘intensity’, ‘vitality’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘self-overcoming’ which are not to be aligned with a naive transgressionism but with an affirmative ascesis or ‘healthy morality’(TI p. 45) insofar as to affirm immanence is to contest the credibility of the notion of ‘repression’ [cf. Foucault: HS I + your Nietz/Fouc. pap!]. All phenomena contain intrinsically the seeds of their own affirmative destruction. As a contested site of multiple, mobile forces a phenomenon, ‘natural’ or ‘cultural’, merely awaits an immanent rather than oppositional critique in order to unlock its intrinsic self-excess [cf. WIP pp. 73-5, 99-100, 130; AO p. 109].  
 The notion of the sublime is seemingly irretrievably mired within metaphysics as a religio-aesthetic category indelibly stained with the transcendent. Nonetheless, the sublime has recently, given the transvaluative context of contemporary thought, been increasingly valorized as synonymous with the ‘limits of presentation’ and the ‘logic of transgression’ associated with it. The entire focus on excess and alterity, not to mention the post-theistic rethinking of the ‘sacred’ and ‘divine’, are either implicitly or explicitly thematisations of the sublime. As I shall attempt to illustrated later in the paper how these developments concern the immanentisation of the sublime, a ‘becoming-immanent of the noumena’. This is not the metaphysical theme of the manifestation of the absolute [‘phenomenology of spirit’] but rather the transvaluative absolutisation of manifestation [the ‘history of being’]. [Is there a ‘‘history’ of immanence’?].  
 At the heart of many of the debates concerning the philosophical evolution of the terminology I have been discussing there often lies a fundamental ambiguity concerning the notion of ‘transcendence’. For the immanentist this term has to be disentangled from its metaphysical interpretation in terms of the transcendent and affirmed as an incessant movement of ‘self-transcendence’ without a transcendent terminus. This thought of an originary expulsion or exteriority that perennially dislocates interiority is central to the rethinking of immanence. In short, the task of thematising a ‘post-metaphysical’ sublimity concerns the recognition and affirmation of an immanent rather than transcendent form of transcendence. Examples of this valorization of transcendence abound in the texts of many immanentists who do not exhibit the slightest allergy to transcendence as such but only to its reductive metaphysical appropriation in transcendent terms. 
                                                           II
 Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Sublime’ is a compelling drama in which the most immanent of the a priori powers of the mind, the ‘imagination’, is brought into a direct and ruinous confrontation with the most transcendent, namely, ‘reason’. Kant’s ‘official’ narrative here is that of the aesthetic disclosure of the ‘suprasensuous vocation’ of humanity and its essential distinction in kind from the natural order. The presentational powers of the mind are overwhelmed by the ‘contrapurposiveness’ of ‘crude nature’ whose scale and force exceed all presentation. Reason, is thereby induced to add insult to the injury already inflicted on the imagination by demanding that it attempt to present the theoretical and practical ‘ideas’ of reason. The intrinsic ‘inadequacy’ of the imagination to achieve a ‘direct’ or ‘positive’ presentation in this regard demonstrates the sublimity of mind which can at least think of these ‘ideas’. This disclosure of the limits of presentation and what transcends it through the very discord of the imagination and reason further underscores the a priori ‘principle’ that Kant identifies in this area of his critical endeavor, the recovery of a critically disciplined notion of teleology, namely the ‘subjective purposiveness’ of the aesthetic feelings of pleasure and displeasure.  
 However, barely concealed beneath the surface of this formal account of the negative or ‘indirect’ mode of the presentation of the unpresentable, lies a highly charged affective-libidinal dynamics, a transcendental Schadenfreude enjoyed by reason as the imagination is simultaneously crushed and humiliated. Kant relishes this affectivity of asceticism itself, the ‘sacred thrill’ of the sublime (CAJ 29: p. 129) which he indulges without restraint. He is unable to exercise any restraint in relation to the pleasures of asceticism itself which he terms ‘negative pleasure’; the pleasure reason takes from the displeasure of the imagination.  
 There are thus two key themes in Kant’s account of the sublime crucial to my concerns here and which are radically reworked in the thought of his principal successors in the project of critique in whose texts the transcendent conception of the sublime Kant retains but critically disciplines is increasingly superseded by an immanent form of it. These are the themes of ‘negative presentation’ and ‘negative pleasure’. For Kant this inherent negativity is a consequence of the critically delimited interaction of the noumenal-transcendent and phenomenal-immanent domains as the imagination cannot (without falling into ‘fanaticism’ and ‘mania’) present positively the transcendent ideas of reason. The imagination can in Kant’s terminology, in the case of the sublime, only offer a ‘symbolic’ rather than ‘schematic’, form of ‘hypotyposis’ or ‘exhibition’ (CAJ 59: p. 226). The transcendental affectivity in question must be characterized as a ‘negative pleasure’ insofar as it is the fusion of the different perspectives of reason and the imagination respectively and is manifest in an intense libidinal dynamics of ‘repulsion and attraction’ to the object adjudged sublime. This is Kant’s version of the ‘duality’ all thinkers locate as constitutive of the feeling of sublimity. Kant’s immanentist successors rework both of these aspects of his account of the sublime and argue that an immanent rather than transcendent sublime, cannot be thematised in terms of the positive/negative opposition. Instead, immanent sublimity  is characterised by an affirmative manifestation and affectivity.
 In recent years commentators such as Escoubas, Lacoue-Labarthe, Lyotard, Nancy and Sallis have demonstrated how Kant’s text resonates with the ‘unthought’ condition of possibility of metaphysics, the ‘question of of presentation’ (SPQ p. 2). However, impressive though these readings, are they have a tendency to marginalise the libidinal and affective dimensions of Kant’s text, as if the ‘negative pleasure’ where a mere accompaniment to ‘negative presentation’ rather than, arguably, the source of it. A reading that draws upon Nietzsche’s redefinition of philosophy as a ‘comparative erotics’ is more able to fully harvest the crucial insights Kant’s text provides into the libidinal economy of the ‘Platonic-Christian’ psyche. The multifacited orgy of ‘violence’ and ‘domination’ (die Gewalt) that characterises the relation between the imagination and reason in Kant’s text recalls Nietzsche’s reflections of ‘cruelty’ (Grausmkeit) as the libidinal-affective essence of metaphysics. Kant’s sublime emerges as an instantiation of the ‘pessimism’ Nietzsche identifies at the source of metaphysics. In his own thematisation of the immanent sublime in The Birth of Ttragedy, Nietzsche will supplant this, supposedly universalisable, ‘negative pleasure’ with the affirmative sensibility of ‘tragic joy’.
                                                       
III
 Nietzsche’s thought can be said to be obsessively engaged with something like the immanent sublime. The entire project of the ‘revaluation of all values hitherto’ is dedicated to the affirmation of ‘this world’ as a radically self-sufficient field of material immanence in contrast to the nihilistic ‘denial of life’ bourne of pessimism and physiological depletion that generates the ‘moral-optical illusion’ (TI p. 39) of the transcendent. As he states, ‘the world is the will to power - and nothing besides!’  (WP sec. 1067). 
 It might be claimed that Nietzsche only attained a fully immanent perspective in his late texts in which he overcomes an earlier embroilment in the Kantian-Schopenhauerian terminology of the ‘noumenon/phenomenon’ distinction. Nietzsche’s retrospective interpretation of his early texts, whilst far from unequivocal, often promotes such an interpretation. The most famous expression of this allegedly belated overcoming of the seemingly residual ‘metaphysical’ structures of his earlier thinking is, of course, “How the ‘True World’ at last Became a Fable” (TI p. 41) [+ TI p. 39] in which, in Heidegger’s formulation, Nietzsche ‘twists free’ (Ni1 24: pp. 201-02) of the suprasensuous/sensuous distinction such that the sublime appearing of being is identified with the being of appearing itself. With this, supposedly ‘late’, development Nietzsche is finally able to affirm the ontological primacy of Schein, which retro-spectively emerges as his polysemic ‘name for being’. 
 This simple periodisation of Nietzsche’s thought has, however, been widely contested and I shall focus here on the role of the immanent sublime in The Birth of Tragedy. The obvious theme to be identified with the immanent sublime not only in this context but throughout Nietzsche’s thought, is the Dionysian. With reference to the two themes identified as central to the discussion of Kant’s sublime, I shall consider the ‘early’ Nietzsche’s account of the mode of presencing of the Dionysian noumenon and the affectivity associated with it. On both counts an affirmative-immanent supplants a negative-transcendent perspective. This reading afirms the radical immanence of the ontology of The Birth of Tragedy, its ‘artist’s metaphysics’. The contrast Nietzsche draws between the ‘tragic’ and ‘Socratic’ periods in terms of the ‘death of tragedy’ concerns the advent of oppositional evaluative structures which make possible the institution of the transcendent. The triumph of ‘aesthetic Socratism’ is the death of immanence, the advent of the ‘music-practicing Socrates’ and the momentum of Kantian-Schopenhaurian critique, its rebirth.  
 Nietzsche’s treatment in his early texts of theme of the manifestation of the Dionysian concerns the ontological primacy he grants ‘music’ over ‘language’ (image and concept) an issue which has received a great deal of critical attention in recent years [eg. Lacoue-Labarthe, de Man, Kofman, Sallis, Staten, Warminski]. In his non-dialectical account of the fusion of the Dionysian-noumenon with the Apollonian-phenomenon in tragedy Nietzsche implicitly overcomes the Kantian problematic of ‘negative presentation’ and proposes a non-objectificatory yet affirmative form of manifestation of the sublime. On this basis it is possible to interpret Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘primal oneness’ (Ur-Eine, BT 1: p. 17) and the ‘mystical feeling of oneness’ induced by tragedy (BT 2: p. 18) as a realm of immanence that fully incoporates the Apollonian. Of course, in that the ‘primal oneness’ is synonymous with the Dionysian-noumena it cannot be thought of as an undifferentiated unity. It  precedes and exceeds the Apollonian ‘principle of individuation’ and is therefore to be conceived as realm of difference without negation.
 It is the pre-oppositional nature of the the inseperable yet irreducible relation between the Dionysian and Apollonian that provides the milieu for the affirmative disclosure the immanent sublime. This overcomes the noumenon/phenomenon distinction such in that the Dionysian, whilst remaining unpresentifiable and intrinsically excessive, is disclosed as immanent without remainder to the phenomenal order. It is constituted by that which it makes possible and exceeds in a complex relation of co-dependence with the Apollonian.
 Nietzsche’s basic model of the relation between the Dionysian and the Apollonian in tragedy is that of the ‘discharge of music in images’ (BT 6: p. 34) as variously developed in lyric poetry, Dionysian dithyramb and tragedy. The necessity of the mutually constitutive nature of this process of ‘discharge’ is stated thus, ‘Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo, but Apollo finally speaks the language of Dionysus’ (BT 21: p. 104). This is a relation of reciprocity in which ‘becoming’ takes precedence. Tragedy is the domain of the simultaneous becoming-Apollonian of the Dionysian and  becoming-Dionysian of the Apollonian. Nietzsche refers here to the ‘primordial relationship between the thing in itself and appearance’ (BT 8: p. 62). In a similar vein he writies of ‘how music strives to express its nature in Apollonion images’ (BT 16: p. 103) such that it, ‘must seek to attain...its highest objectification in images’ (ibid). Furthermore Nietzsche claims that tragedy ‘absorbs the highest musical ecstasies, and thus brings music to its true perfection’ (BT 21: p. 100). 
 Another important theme which provides further evidence of the immanent nature of Nietzsche’s thought in his first book is the reconfiguration of the noumena/phenomena distinction in terms of the primacy of what he terms the ‘visible middle world’ (sichtbaren Mittelwelt, BT 24: p. 113). Tragedy is described as the ‘middle world of the theatrical event, the drama itself’ (ibid) and throughout his text Nietzsche argues for its primacy, as the phase of Greek cultural history in which an auto-transfiguration of immanence occurs.
 It is no less contentious to claim that Nietzsche offers a fully affirmative account of tragic affectivity in The Birth of Tragedy and thereby already attains to the ‘tragic joy’ that, for instance, Deleuze (cf. NP pp. 10-22) exclusively locates in the ‘late’ texts. The transvaluation at issue here concerns the joyous affirmation of the Dionysian and the rejection of the pessimism that generates the illusions of the transcendent and the nihilistic-Schopenhauerian conception of art as that which provides a respite and escape from the will, body, instincts etc. The affirmative affectivity celebrates the fundamentally dysteleological character of the immanent sublimity of life. This Dionysian excess can be identified with the ‘contrapurposive’ of ‘crude nature’ that Kant rejected in his critical teleological appropriation of the sublime.
 Between the ‘pessimism’ of the ‘wisdom of Silenus’ which, in Nietzsche’s view, characterised the pre-tragic response to the Dionysian, such that the Apollonion merely provides ‘redemption through illusion’ (BT 4: p. 25/45 [k]) and the ‘optimism’ of the Socratic-theoretical type that marks the ‘death of tragedy’ Nietzsche excavates a ‘noble’ overcoming of pessimism in which the dissolution of the ‘human’ manifest in the fate of the tragic hero is affirmed. The disclosure of the sublimity of Dionysian, pre-individuated life in its impersonality and precedence over the individuated self becomes, through tragedy, affirmable and an affectivity beyond either ‘pessimism’ or ‘optimism’ is cultivated. Although the affectivity of the sublime remains intrinsically ‘dual’ in its tragic form a transvaluation occurs such that the pleasure in the displeasure of the dissolution of self-identity concerns the sublimity of impersonal self-differentiated life rather than the Kantian escape route of transcendent reason.  
 That such a transvaluative affirmative rather than negative affectivity can be detected in The Birth of Tragedy would require a careful interpretation of a key theme Nietzsche heavily criticised in his preface to the second edition, the very notion he identifies as the ‘tragic effect’ itself, namely, ‘metaphysical comfort’ or ‘consolation’ (BT 7: pp. 39-40). It is significant that in the ‘Attempt at a Self-criticism’ Nietzsche attacks (ASC 7: pps. 10-12) the appearance of this term in the later sections of the text (BT 18: pp. 85, 88) rather than its role in the earlier explicit account of tragedy. It is possible to argue that, when returned to its context, this theme, which admittedly carries a transcendent rather than immanent resonance, can be precisely conceived in terms of the immanentist demand for ‘the art of this-worldly consolation’ (ASC 7: pps. 11-12) which the later Nietzsche makes [cf. your ‘tragsub’ pap!]. 
 In this respect it is crucial to appreciate Nietzsche’s distinction between the ‘pre-tragic’ and ‘tragic’ forms of the Dionysian/Apollonian relation. A key moment in this respect is Nietzsche claim that tragedy, ‘as the objectification of a Dionysian state is not Apollonian redemption through illusion but rather a representation of the shattering of the individual and his fusion with primal being’ (BT 8: pps. 43-4/65 [k]). This establishes the affirmative nature of tragic affectivity of the manifestation of the Dionysian sublime that surpasses the negative response of the pessimistic ‘pre-tragic’ period. A transvaluation is achieved in tragedy such that the ‘self-oblivion’ intrinsic to the Dionysian is valorised as ‘indestructibly powerful and joyful’ (BT 7: p. 39). Nietzsche refers to the feeling induced by the return to immanence of the tragic hero as a ‘higher pleasure’ (BT 24: p. 114). 
 In the final sections of his text Nietzsche attains to an uncompromisingly a-subjective and radically immanentist perspective. He writes of the ‘artistic game which the will in the eternal abundance of its pleasure, plays with itself’ (ibid) and further underwrites the joyous affectivity associated with the sublime avowal of the inconsequentiality of individuation in reminding us that the Dionysian is ‘the spirit that playfully builds and destroys the world of individuals as the product of a primal pleasure’ (ibid). 
 That Nietzsche radicalised this affirmative manifestation and affectivity of an immanent sublimity in his ‘late’ texts is uncontentious. Nietzsche thereby retains and deepens the religious atmosphere of his early thinking, the rapport with the immanentist religious perspective of the pre-Socratic Greeks. The immanent character of this sublimity is further indexed in his later texts by the overtly ‘physiological’ discourse adopted, in particular his ‘physiology of aesthetics’ (GM I: 13) not that this was absent from The Birth of Tragedy. Throughout his thought Nietzsche develops a transvalued notion of the auto-transfiguration of material life in art. In a late text on art he writes of ‘an excess and overflow of blooming physicality into the world of images and desires...the images and desires of intensified life’ (WP sec. 802) and in a similar vein he states that, 
     “when we encounter things that display this transfiguration and fullness, the animal responds 
         with an excitation of those spheres in which all those pleasurable states are situated...a blending 
         of these very delicate nuances of animal well-being and desires constitutes the aesthetic state...
         in natures capable of that bestowing and overflowing fullness of bodily vigor” (WP sec. 801). 
 For Nietzsche art is the principle means of countering nihilism and its transvaluative role in his thinking is clear in the claim that, ‘art is essentially affirmation, blessing, deification of existence’ (WP sec. 821). 
 In such passages Nietzsche’s contestatation of the ‘Platonic-Christian’ assessment of the value of life and the ‘meaning of suffering’ etc., is at its most intense. The immanent sublime, the material field of anonymous becoming without beginning or end, the mobile flow of pre-individuated life which contests the fragile illusions of self-identity and organic integrity, is contrasted with the reduction ad absurdum of individuation, the egomania of the ‘immortality of the soul’. In this respect Nietzsche writes that, 
     ‘“...the highest and most illustrious human joys...existence celebrates its own transfiguration... 
       a deification of the body in themselves as distant as possible from the ascetic philosophy of the
       proposition ‘God is spirit’” (WP sec. 1051). 
 As a thinker of immanence, Nietzsche develops a ‘tragic’ conception of the sublime characterised by an affirmative conception of its manifestation and affectivity. As an immanent process of self-differentiation that makes possible all presentification the sublimity of life itself cannot be either ‘schematically’ or ‘symbolically’ presented as both forms of metaphysical exhibition presuppose presence. The Nietzschean sublime can be contrasted with the negative, Kantian transcendent appropriation of it in that the latter is inherently pessimistic and ‘moral’. Nietzsche is no longer concerned with the negative disclosure of the ‘intelligible in the sensible’ but with the manifestation of the immanent alterity of Dionysian life. The aesthetico-religious resonances of this heirophany are explicitly expressed in the famous closing section of The Will to Power - an astonishing affirmation of the immanent sublime, 
      “this world: a monster of energy...as force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces,
          at the same time one and many...a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing,
          eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms
         ...blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a becoming that knows itself as that which
         must return eternally, as a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness...my Dio-
         nysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying” (WP sec. 1067).

                   
IV
 The question of the extent to which Heidegger thematises and sustains the immanent sublime marks the point at which internecine disputes can begin to occur among immanentists. Hence, Deleuze and Guattari claim that Heidegger’s thought, and post-Husserlian phenomenology in general, fails to attain to the uncompromising conception of absolute immanence they develop and the notion of the philosophical ‘concept’ adequate to it  [cf. WIP pp. 44-51, 73-5, 140-44, 149-50, 154-55]. Hardt has rightly insisted on the ‘ontological’ nature of Deleuze’s thought but felt obliged to issue the following clarification,  
     “we should be careful from the outset to distinguish this from a Heideggerian return to 
        ontology...Deleuze will only accept “superficial” responses to the question “what makes 
        being possible?”...he limits us to a strictly immanent and materialist ontological discourse 
        that refuses any deep or hidden foundation of being. There is nothing veiled or negative 
        about Deleuze’s being; it is fully expressed in the world. Being, in this sense, is superficial,
        positive and full...this Deleuzian conception of ontology is radically different from
        the...Heideggerian...particularly with regard to its positivity and materialism...any term such 
        as being-in-the-world would have no sense in Deleuze’s ontology because being is always
        already actual; it is always fully expressed...only a materialist approach can adequately account
        for both this superficiality and plenitude” (GDAP pp. xiii, 114-15 [+ cf. pp. 123, 125]).
 I would argue, in contrast, that a reading of Heidegger’s ontology is possible that could demonstrate that it is, in its affirmation of immanence, difference, multiplicity, alterity etc., also affirming the ‘superficiality and plenitude’ of being. There is ‘nothing veiled or negative’ about being in Heidegger’s sense or is such entailed in the notion of ‘being-in-the-world’ (in-der- Welt-sein). Heidegger nowhere, to adapt Nietzsche, ‘seperates being from what it can do’. There is nothing to being other than ‘being-in-the-world’. Indeed the notion of ‘being-in-the-world’ along with the contemporaneous analyses of the ‘transcendence of the world’ (BT 69 [+ cf. ER, MFL]) can, if interpreted non-reductively, be regarded as a radical formulation of an immanent sublimity. The ‘finite transcendence’ of the dynamic relational context that constitutes Dasein as that being ‘always already’ beyond and outside itself in itself is ‘grounded’ in the differential inter-play of the three ec-stases of temporality. It is an economy of relations that precedes negation and which radically affirms the irreducible primacy of an originary exteriority (cf. BT 65: p. 377). 
 Now that the faults of the Existentialist-humanist and Voluntarist misinterpretations of Heidegger have been definitively exposed the impersonalism of his ontology of immanent transcendence can be appreciated. For the ‘early’ Heidegger human being is an ‘effect’ of the anonymous temporalising of ecstatic temporality. The manifestation of sublimity, the disclosure of disclosedness, resides in this context, in the analysis of ‘being-towards-death’ and the ‘fundamental attunment’ of ‘anxiety’ whereby Dasein is required to non-relationally affirm its primal relatedness, to make its essential alterity its own. This is an anonymous individuation in which all self-possession is dessiminated. 
 Undeniably Heidegger insists on the ‘self-concealing’ character of being or ‘unconceal-ment’, which defers in favour of the beings that thereby presence as present or as absent. However, this ‘withdrawal of being’ does not imply a transcendent dimension of being. The ‘self-concealment’ and ‘withdrawal’, the lethe of a-letheia, remains entirely immanent as the unpretentious character of the presencing of beings. The sublimity of the technological epoch for Heidegger concerns the uncany, non-privative advent or approach of this ‘withdrawal’, the presencing of the ‘concealed as concealed’. If there is anything esoteric or ‘mystical’ about this then it is an entirely immanent rather than transcendent esotericism or mysticism that affirms the omnipresent absentiality which saturates ‘mortal’ existence.   
 To appreciate the radical immanence of Heidegger’s thought it is essential to recognise the extent to which his insights into the ‘ontological difference’ render being completely insubstantial. For Heidegger being as unconcealment is an enigmatic process of manifestation or presencing conceived as a spontaneous and autonomous, although nonetheless finite, process of self-differing. It is an anonymous power of differential origination that is completely unthematisable in theological or anthropological terms. 
 A key aspect of his thinking, synonymous with the immanent sublime, is his insistence on the ‘finitude of being’. Four, closely inter-related, elements can be identified in this notion. Firstly, the essential historicality of being. Although being is not a-historical it is not reducible to history either, ontology is redefined rather than rejected.  Secondly, being is inseperable from, yet irreducible to, beings as their disclosedness, being is identical in toto with the ‘being of beings’, it is nothing over and above the multifarious ways to be or appear of beings which it non-reductively governs whilst remaining entirely immanent to beings. This is the ‘univocity’ of the multiplicity of being. Thirdly, being ‘needs and uses’ human being. There is a relation of co-dependence between being and thinking which dispossesses as it ‘privileges’ human being. Finally, being is intrinsically always already outside itself in itself or ‘ecstatic’, it is not infinitely self-present but infinitely self-absent or self-differentiated. It is intrinsically other to itself without reference to an other, indeed negation reduces its otherness insofar as it introduces determination and individuation. 
 Heidegger’s thematisation of being as immanence is most radically and rigorously expressed in a key notion of his ‘later’ texts, namely, the ‘rift-design’ (der Aufriß). This has profound affinities with many aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology insofar as it concerns the auto-poeisis of a crossing or cutting of the field of immanence which incessantly generates differential relations. Through this term Heidegger develops a complex logic of relation that anticipates the notion of ‘mutual becoming’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. [cf. fn. in your ‘B-A’ pap.] It is a thought of the simultaneous movement of dispersion and gathering, or what Heidegger terms the ‘joining of the rift’ (die Fuge des Risses, PLT, p. 205). Heidegger frequently identifies the ‘rift-design’ with the theme of ‘pain’ (der Schmerz) wherein, perhaps, the ‘ambiguous’ affectivity of the sublime can be located in his texts.  
 It is to art in general and poetry in particular that Heidegger turns for the affirmative manifestation of the immanent sublimity of being. As with Nietzsche this is, for Heidegger, an essentially heirophantic issue which he pre-eminently explores in dialogue with Hölderlin’s poetry. An exceptional example of this is the 1951 text “...Poetically Man Dwells...” (PLT pp. 213-29) a reading of part of Hölderlin’s late poem “In Lovely Blueness...”. For Heidegger, Hölderlin’s poem is of an ontological stature insofar as it is the site for the auto-poietic advent of a ‘measure’, ‘dimension’ or ‘metric’ (PLT p. 220) that is presupposed by and makes possible all ‘ontic’ modes of calculation. This ontological measure is identified by Heidegger with the mysterious manifestation of the ‘divine’ or ‘godhead’ as the ‘Unknown One’ in the images of the ‘sights of the sky’ in the poem.
 For Heidegger the imagery of Hölderlin’s poem provides an affirmative mode of manifestation for the ‘Unknown One’ interpreted as an immanent sublimity. The specific mode of manifestation is described thus, 
     “...the genuine image lets the invisible be seen and so imagines the invisible in something alien 
        to it...imaginings that are visible inclusions of the alien in the sight of the familiar” (PLT p.
        226).
  It is undoubtedly the case that in valorising this Hölderlinian imagery of the divine as the  ‘Unknown One’ and adopting the notion of the ‘invisible’ etc., Heidegger seems, at first glance, to be drifting away from immanence towards a transcendent thematisation of being. This would however, be a fundamental misinterpretation that failed to appreaciate many of the basic aspects of Heidegger’s thought. Indeed I would claim that Heidegger broaches in this text what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the ‘virtual’ nature of immanence [cf. WIP pp. 154-62]. The Hölderlinian ‘Unknown One’ is not, in this context, the Kantian transcendent noumenon and could more accurately be conceived as the ‘virtuality’ of being that itself finds in Hölderlin’s poetry its appropriately affirmative rather than negative mode of manifestation.
 From Heidegger’s ontological perspective the notion of ‘essence’ (Wesen) as eigen, eigentlich etc., concerns an originary self-excess. Hence that which is radically other to itself in itself, in this context the ‘godhead’ synonymous here with being as such, has as its domain of non-alienated self-disclosure without reserve the ‘alien’ which provides the most hospitable milieu for the appearing of appearing or exteriority as such. The sublimity of the divine refers here to the advent of an entirely immanent otherness, an absentiality without lack.
 In his interpretation of the theme of the ‘Unknown One’ in the poem Heidegger eschews an epistemological for an ontological perspective. Hence, the unknown quality of the divine does not refer to the limitations of a merely finite being but is the fully affirmative notion of the play of concealing and revealing within immanent presencing itself. In showing itself as such in the images of Hölderlin’s poem being as presencing overtly and fully ‘withdraws’ into an ‘alien’ sphere that is most its own given that it has no self-identity to alienate. The immanent ‘unknown’ thereby appears without compromising its unobjectifiable nature. Indeed, the unobjectifiable nature of presencing explicitly discloses itself as such and without reserve in Hölderlin’s poem. This is a move from the self-concealing of self-concealing that characterised the immanence of being in the epoch of ‘metaphysics’ to the revelation of self-concealing and the release of the ‘names for being’ in the technological epoch - a ‘turn’ Heidegger predominantly, it has to be said, mishandles by thematising it in negative and oppositional terms. However, the text under consideration is one of Heidegger’s more successful in this respect. As he states, 
     “...the measure consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown, is revealed
         as such by the sky. God’s appearance through the sky consists in a disclosing that lets
         us see what conceals itself, but lets us see it not by seeking to wrest what is concealed 
         out of its concealedness, but only by guarding the concealed in its self-concealment. 
         Thus the unknown god appears as the unknown by way of the sky’s manifestness. This
         appearance is the measure against which man measures himself” (PLT p. 223).
  This passage implicitly rejects the transcendent sublime and its ‘negative presentation’ and thematises the affirmative manifestation of an immanent sublime. The difference is between the negative manifestation in the phenomenal order of the unpresentifiable  transcendent (ie. Kant’s sublime) and the affirmative presencing of self-concealing yet fully immanent being as such, the manifestation of the self-difference inherent to beings. It is the non-privative manifestation of that which, as manifestness per se is presupposed by, and thus irreducible to any ‘dialectic’ of the visible and invisible. Unlike Kant, Heidegger’s ‘invisible’ is, without remainder, in (the) visible. 
 The Heideggerian-Hölderlinian hierophany is not merely concerned with the incarnation of a transcendent divinity but, having identified the divine with ‘radiance’ (Schein) as such, the manifestation of the immanent sublime. Ontological and immanent hierophany is not concerned with the mode of appearing of a transcendent or dialectically conceived personal deity but is itself deified. In particular, there is nothing here of ‘negative theology’ as this is not the revelation of the absence of ground but the full-frontal exposure of the ground of absence. Not the negative appearing of the ground of presence but the affirmative manifestation of the ground of absence. This is a hierophany without a god, an ontological perspective in which immanent manifestation as such is itself conceived as more divine than god. As Heidegger states, 
      “Into this, which is intimate to man but alien to the god, the unknown imparts himself, 
         in order to remain guarded within it as the unknown. But the poet calls all the brightness
         of the sights of the sky and every sound of its courses and breeze into the singing word and
         there makes them shine and ring. Yet the poet...does not describe the mere appearance of sky
         and earth. The poet calls, in the sights of the sky, that which conceals itself and indeed as that 
         which conceals itself. In the familiar appearances, the poet calls the alien as that to which the 
         invisible imparts itself in order to remain what it is - unknown” (PLT p. 225). 
 Hardt is, however, correct when he implies in the passage I cited earlier that Heidegger’s credentials as an immanentist are seriously undermined insofar as he is not a ‘materialist’ even though, of course, he isn’t an idealist either. Nonetheless, in contrast to Hardt I find that Heidegger’s shortcomings in this regard are not ontological but ‘genealogical’ in nature. It is undeniable that, unlike the other immanentists I consider here, Heidegger singularly failed to appreciate the possibility of a ‘post-metaphysical’ philosophical or ‘transcendental’ materialism. That a ‘materialist’ thematisation of a-letheia and the ‘phenomenological ontology’ of the ‘finite transcendence’ of ‘world’ was not ontologically illegitimate in principle eluded Heidegger. This had near fatal consequences in his reading of Nietzsche. Heidegger undoubtedly threw the ‘baby’ of non-reductive materialism out with the ‘bathwater’ of substance metaphysics and positivism, forgetting that ‘scienticism’ and ontologically deficient philosophies of science were the problem and not science per se.  
 There is nothing in Heidegger’s thought remotely akin to the creative ‘perpetual interbreeding’ (WIP p. 24) that characterises Deleuze’s and Guattari’s relation to the sciences and Nietzsche’s before them. Its not obvious that these philosophical materialists commit a serious ontological faux pas in this repsect. Indeed such thinkers demonstrate the possibility of developing powerful materialist critiques of ‘reactive’ and anthropomorphic elements of science which have the advantage avoiding neo-humanism.

                                                           VI
 Although  notions such as the ‘body without organs’, the ‘abstract machine’ and the ‘plane of consistency’ could be cited from their earlier texts I shall, in this brief and preliminary consideration of the extent to which Deleuze and Guattari are thinkers of the immanent sublime, focus on their 1991 text, What is Philosophy? An intriguing aspect of Deleuze’s and Guatarri’s implicit thematisation of the immanent sublime is the status and possibilities they find for its affirmation in a rethought notion of the philosophical ‘concept’. Philosophy does not have to turn to art or religious feeling in order to affirm an immanent sublimity but has indigenous means of its non-reductive manifestation.
 Deleuze and Guattari develop a fully postitive, materialist ontology of self-differentiation couched in an uncompromisingly impersonalist discourse in order to explicate what they refer to as the ‘plane of immanence’. This is one of the three elements that constitute philosophy alongside the creation of ‘concepts’ that articulate immanence and the ‘conceptual personae’ that embody and arise from it [cf. WIP pp. 76-77]. The interaction of these three elements constitutes the radical ‘constructivism’ of philosophy. None of them are pre-given but are engaged in a constantly renewed process of auto-poeisis, and mutual co-creation [cf. WIP pp. 7, 11, 35].
 Deleuze’s and Guattari’s initial characterisation of the ‘plane of immanance’ is as ‘a powerful whole that, while remaining open , is not fragmented: an unlimited One-All, an “Omnitudo”” (WIP p. 35). However, this ‘whole’ is neither a pre-existing perma-nently enduring substratum nor a historically emergent absolute. So far as it is not identified with the concepts it makes possible and yet requires the ‘plane of immanence’ cannot be conceived as a conceptual totality or universal (ibid). It is a ‘virtual’ realm, more ontologically fundamental than ‘actuality’ that is first established by the concepts and conceptual personae it makes possible. It is variously described as ‘fractal’ in nature, as providing an ‘absolute horizon’ for ‘conceptual events’ and as the ‘indivisible milieu’ in which concepts are distributed [cf. WIP pp. 36-9]. 
 The primacy of the ‘plane of immanence’ within the field of philosophyis clear in a number of ways. It is the source of the ‘image of thought’ associated with any body of concepts and ‘conceptual personae’, the specific orientation and conception of the nature and task of thinking implicit in a philosophy (WIP p. 37). It is also aligned with a notion of ‘infinite movement’ or ‘speed’ [cf. WIP pp. 36-8], a ‘moving desert that concepts come to populate’ (WIP p. 41). Although ‘always single’ the palane of immanence is ‘pure variation’ (WIP p. 39). It is described as the ‘absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or deterretorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts’ (ibid). It is presupposed by philosophy and is in this sense ‘prephilosophical’ but nonetheless it ‘does not exist outside of philosophy’ but rather as a fundamental dimension of ‘non-philosophy’ intrinsic to it as its ‘internal condition’ [cf. WIP pp. 40-41].
 Most significantly it is considered to be the ‘fold’ that precedes and relates ‘being and thinking’ that gives the realms of ‘thought’ and ‘nature’ as the relation between them they presuppose [cf. WIP pp. 38, 44, 48]. In Spinozist terms ‘this plane presents two sides to us, extension and thought, or rather its two powers, ‘powers of being’ and ‘power of thinking’ (WIP p. 48). 
 Deleuze and Guattari confirm their immanentist orientation in their explicit critique of the transcendent and diagnosis of the means of its production. This always involves a forgetting and inversion of conditions and priorities concerning the relation between ‘plane’ and ‘concept’ [cf. WIP pp. 44-5] such that immanence can erroneously appear derivative from, as an attribute of, that which presupposes and fails to sustain it. The uncomprominsing nature of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s insistence on the primacy of immanence as the unified field of difference, multiplicity and becoming, is clear in the claim that, ‘whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the transcendent’ (WIP p. 45). This point does not merely apply to God and the ‘transcendental subject’ but to any prioritisation of objectification, signification, representation, consciousness or any means or outcome of the ‘slowing down’ of the ‘plane of immanence’ that accords itself more than a derivative, anthropomorphic and merely utilititarian status. As Deleuze and Guattari, aligning here the transcendence with transcendent state, ‘all that is necessary is for movement to be stopped. Transcendence enters as soon as movement of the infinite is stopped...When immanence is no longer immanent to something other than itself it is possible to speak of a plane of immanence’ (WIP p. 47).  
 The ‘plane of immanence’ inhabits a perilous terrain between ‘chaos’ and the ‘transcendent’ with the warding-off of the former through the institution of the latter (either as object, subject or even the ‘Other’ the ‘immanent transcendence’ of phenomenology) leading to the obliteration of immanence. Many of these features of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thought of immanence and its sublimity are encapsulated in the following passage, 
     “We will say that THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought 
         and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought...It is the most intimate
         within thought and yet the absolute outside - an outside more distanct that any external world
         because it is an inside deeper that any internal world: it is immanence...the incessant to-ing and
         fro-ing of the plane, infinite movement. Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so
         much to think THE plane as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane, and to think it in
         this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the not-external outside and the not-internal
         inside - that which cannot be thought and yet must be thought...” (WIP pp. 59-60).  
 In many respects Deleuze’s and Guattari’s identification of the task of philosophy with the affirmation of immanence is synonymous with their notion of becoming in its ontological primacy as the being of becoming. For Deleuze and Guattari ‘becoming is always double’ (WIP p. 109) and it establishes a fully postitive ‘zone of exchange’ (ibid) or non-privative indetermination in which the human can depart from itself in a ‘becoming-other’ (WIP p. 112) which is required if the ‘plane of immanence’ is to attained. This becoming is a non-historical dimension radically inseperable from but irreducible to history. It is the ‘untimely’(WIP pp. 112) or ‘stratigraphic’ (WIP pp. 58-9) rather than the eternal or historical. As they state, 
     “...becoming is the concept itself. It is born in History, and falls back into it, but it is not of it
        ...it has neither beginning nor end but only a milieu...The time of becoming concerns the
        primacy of a ‘meanwhile [un entre-temps]” (WIP pp. 110, 158).    
  It is through their thematisation of the relation between the notions of ‘chaos’, the ‘plane of immanence’, ‘becoming’, the ‘virtual’ and the ‘event’ that Deleuze and Guattari broach the immanent sublime and its manifestation. The notion of ‘chaos’ or the ‘virtual’ is undoubtedly an implicit figure of the sublime within What is Philosophy? Its interaction with, in the case of philosophy, the ‘plane of immanence’ and its ‘concepts’ could be said to implicit thematise the possibility of an affirmative (rather than negative) mode of manifestation of the sublime. Deleuze and Guattari offer the following initial definition of ‘chaos’,
      “Chaos is defined not so much by disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form
         taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingess but a virtual, ...drawing out 
         all possible forms, which spring up only to diappear immediately...Chaos is an infinite speed 
         of birth and disappearance” (WIP p. 118).
  Many aspects of this passage evoke sublimity, not least its conception of ‘form’ and the ‘virtual’. The gesture and aim of philosophy in this regard seems to consist in the development of an affirmative manifestation of this sublime chaos,  
     “...philosophy wants to know how to retain infinite speeds while gaining consistency, by giving 
       the virtual a consistency specific to it. The philosophical sieve, as plane of immanence that cuts
       through the chaos, selects infinite movements of thought and is filled with concepts formed like
       consistent particles going as fast as thought” (WIP p. 118).
 The index or principal manifestation of this manifestation of the sublime chaos in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s text is the notion of the ‘Event’. The following account of this theme resonates with an immanent sublimity, 
      “The virtual is no longer the chaotic virtual but rather virtuality that has become consistent,
         that has become an entity formed on a plane of immanence that sections the chaos. This is
         what we call the Event, or the part that eludes its own actualization in everything that happens.
         The event...is actualized...but it has a shadowy and secret part that is continually subtracted
         from or added to its actualization:...it neither begins nor ends but has gained or kept the infinite
         movement to which it gives consistency. It is the virtual that is distinct from the actual, but a 
         virtual that is no longer chaotic, that has become consistent or real on the plane of immanence
         that wrests it from the chaos - it is a virtual that is real without being actual, ideal without being
         abstract...the event is pure immanence of what is not actualized or of what remains indifferent 
         to actualization, since its reality does not depend upon it” (WIP p. 156).
  Deleuze and Guattari develop an intense account of the mutual reciprocity and co-dependence of the ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’, with the ‘event’ as the moment of the immanent sublime [cf. WIP pp. 157-59], the non-objectificatory manifestation of the ‘virtual’ in the actual. Within this relation however, Deleuze and Guattari clearly assert the priority of the ‘virtual-concept-event’ domain in which ‘nothing happens...but everything becomes’ (WIP p. 158).
 It is, however, in their remarkable impersonalist account of the nature or art that Deleuze and Guattari most effectively evoke the immanent sublime. Art affirmatively sections ‘chaos’ in the unfolding of its ‘plane of composition’ articulated not through concepts but through the release of a ‘bloc of sensations...a compound of percepts and affects’ (WIP p. 164). Art, for Deleuze and Guattari is solely validated by its liberation of the human from the human, by the affirmation of the ‘nonhuman becomings of man’ (WIP p. 169). This is the human receptivity to the becoming of a non-anthropomorphised, sublime world (ibid). It is the realm of a-subjective ‘affects’ and ‘percepts’, the ‘absence of man’ (ibid) [cf. pp. 173, 181, 189]. To de-subjectivise in this way is to displace ‘perceptions’ and ‘affections’ with ‘percepts’ and ‘affects’ and to thereby ‘extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations’ (WIP p. 167). It is in the elaboration of this a-subjective conception of art as a becoming that releases ‘affects’ and ‘percepts’ that Deleuze and Guattari affirm the immanent sublime, 
     “Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach
        and penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation. From the moment that the material
        passes into sensation...art itself lives on these zones of indetermination. They are blocs.
        ...the power of a ground that can dissolve forms and impose the existence of a zone in 
        which we no longer know which is animal and which human, because something like
        the triumph or monument of their nondistinction rises up” (WIP p. 173).
 Deleuze and Guattari thematise a sublimity of ‘nonhuman becoming’, the dissolution of the human through the affirmation of immanence. This is to follows a quite different trajectory to Kant for whom the sublime is appropriated for a transcendent process of becoming human. As Deleuze and Guattari state, ‘its sensory transcendence enters into a hidden or open opposition to the suprasensory transcendence of religion’ (WIP p. 193). Deleuze’s and Guattari’s acconut of art is nowhere more engaged with the sublime and its affirmative manifestation than in the conception of its task as that of, ‘making the invisible forces visible in themselves...to make perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect us, and make us become[?]’ (WIP p. 182).       


